Online Supplement

for

Consequences of Perceiving Organization Members as a Unified Entity: Stronger Attraction, but Greater Blame for Member Transgressions

Contents

Study S1

The purpose of Study S1 was to conceptually replicate Study 1 with a different measure of organizational attraction. We expected that describing organization members as high in entitativity would make participants find the organization more attractive (H1) – an effect mediated by enhanced perceptions of the organization's competence (H2). To assess generalizability, we had participants not only judge Holiday Inn (as in Study 1) but also Airbnb, a sharing-economy organization in the same industry as Holiday Inn.

Method

Participants. We posted slots for 600 participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk – a sample size that offers 80% power to detect a small effect of entitativity on attraction, $d = .23$ Participants who had heard of the organization they would be rating (i.e., Airbnb or Holiday Inn) and those who responded correctly to a comprehension check question were allowed to take the study. A total of 627 participants provided at least some data, of which 9 were dropped for having a duplicate IP address, 2 for having a non-US IP address, 63 for failing the attention check question, and one for missing data. A final sample of 552 participants remained (46.47% women, $M_{Age} = 38.44$ years).

Procedure. We randomly assigned participants to a 2 (entitativity: high vs. low) X 2 (organization: Airbnb vs. Holiday Inn) between-participants design. The purpose of using two different organizations was to test whether the hypothesized effects of entitativity would generalize across different kinds of organizations; we did not have hypotheses about the interaction between organization and entitativity.

After indicating their familiarity with the relevant organization, participants read a realistically-formatted article describing the organization members as either high or low in entitativity (the same articles used in Study 2; see Verbatim Materials at

https://tinyurl.com/yatg2p32). Then participants completed Study 1's attention check and the following measures in the order listed.

Manipulation check. Participants rated the organization members' entitativity on the measure from Study 1 (α = .92).

Organizational attractiveness. Participants next completed a validated 5-item scale of overall organizational attractiveness (Highhouse et al., 2003), adapted to the context of the guest-accommodation industry. The items assessed participants' interest in using the company's services (e.g., "this company would provide a good place to stay" and "this company is attractive to me for booking accommodation;" α = .84).

Competence, warmth, and morality. We administered the same 11-item measure of brand personality from Study 1, which assesses perceptions of the organization's competence (our hypothesized mediator; α = .89), warmth (α = .87) and morality (α = .92).

Results and Discussion

Table S6 reports descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations.

Manipulation check. Confirming the success of our manipulation, participants perceived the organization members as more entitative when the article had described them as high vs. low in entitativity, $F(1,548) = 568.72$, $p < .001$, $d = 2.02$, ($M_{High} = 4.03$, $SD = .56$; $M_{Low} = 2.49$, $SD = .91$) in a 2 (entitativity: high vs. low) X 2 (organization: Holiday Inn vs. Airbnb) ANOVA. Participants also found Airbnb to be less-entitative than Holiday Inn, $F(1,548) = 4.96$, $p = .026$, $d = .12$, ($M_{Airbnb} = 3.19$, $SD = 1.08$; $M_{HolidayInn} = 3.32$, $SD = 1.08$). The interaction term was not significant, $p = .178$.

Organizational attractiveness. As predicted (H1), participants were more attracted to the same organization when the news article described its members as high versus low in

entitativity (M_{High} = 1.55, SD = .97; M_{Low} = 1.41, SD = 1.03), although this main effect was only marginally significant, $F(1,548) = 3.07$, $p = .08$, $d = .15$. (We did not predict an interaction, and the interaction term was not significant, $p = .66$). The fact that this effect was statistically significant in Study 1 and only marginally significant here could indicate that the present study's measure of organizational attractiveness was less sensitive than Study 1's measure, or it could simply reflect sampling variance. In either case, when taken together, the results of the two studies provide convergent support for H1.

Mediation by competence. Replicating Study 1 and supporting H2, the effect of entitativity on attractiveness was significantly mediated by perceptions of the organization's competence, $b = .18$, bias-corrected 95% CI = [.08, .30], computed with 5,000 bootstrap samples in a structural equation model (SEM). That is, people perceived an organization as more competent when it was described as high (vs. low) in entitativity, and the more competent they perceived the organization, the more attracted they were to it. This indirect effect through competence perceptions remained robust when we added parallel mediation paths through warmth and morality in a structural equation model, $b = .11$, [.05, .18], suggesting that competence perceptions can account for entitativity's effect of attractiveness above and beyond perceptions of warmth and morality (see Figure S3).

As in Study 1, we found no support for the alternative explanation that people are attracted to organizations with entitative members because entitativity affects perceptions of warmth. Specifically, the indirect effect through warmth perceptions was not significant in the parallel mediation model, $b = .03$, [-.02, .08]. We did not replicate Study 1's unexpected finding that morality perceptions mediated the effect of entitativity on attractiveness, $b = -.001$, [-.02, .014].

Additional Analyses in Study 2

As noted in the main text, participants indicated how attracted they were to the organization at the end of Study 2. We did not have *a priori* predictions about how the entitativity manipulation would affect perceptions of attractiveness because – in contrast to Studies 1 and S1 – the attractiveness measure came after participants had read and reflected about multiple transgressions by the organization's members. On the one hand, entitativity might increase attraction to the organization by making it appear more competent, as in Studies 1 and S1 (consistent with H1 and H2). On the other hand, entitativity might decrease attraction to the organization by making the organization's leadership appear more blameworthy for the wrongdoings participants had just read about (consistent with the logic of H3). Or perhaps these two processes could cancel each other out, resulting in no net effect. Thus, we considered the attractiveness measure exploratory in this context.

The results showed that the entitativity manipulation did not significantly affect organizational attraction, $F(1, 631) = .01$, $p = .904$, $d = .009$, for the main effect in a 2 (entitativity: high vs. low) X 2 (organization: Airbnb vs. Holiday Inn) ANOVA. (The interaction was not significant either, $p = .91$). Apparently, once people reflect on member transgressions, they do not feel more attracted to more-entitative organizations. One explanation could be that when people perceive an organization as entitative, they are more likely to blame its leaders for member wrongdoing – and the more they blame the leaders, the less attracted they are to the organization. Consistent with this explanation, we observed a significant indirect effect from entitativity, to greater blame, to less attraction, $b = –.04$, 95% $CI = [–.09, –.01]$, bias-corrected and bootstrapped with 5,000 samples.

Study S2

In Study 2, participants assigned more blame to senior management for organization members' wrongdoing when the members were described as exhibiting high (vs. low) entitativity. Study S2 aimed to replicate this finding with a different organization (Uber). Moreover, we wanted to replicate Study 2's finding that omission mediated this effect better then commission.

Study S2's participants read a realistic news article highlighting facts about Uber that made Uber's members appear to exhibit either high or low entitativity. We predicted that participants would hold Uber's management more responsible for member wrongdoing in the high-entitativity condition (H1), and that attributions of omission and commission would both mediate this effect (H2) – especially omission, as in Study 2.

Method

Participants. In advance of data collection, we decided to target 300 complete responses from American MTurk users. This sample size offers 80% power to detect a moderate effect of the entitativity manipulation on attraction, $d = .40$. MTurk provides a relevant source of data for our research because people all over the US routinely read about Uber in the popular media and form judgments about the company and its employees. Participants received $.51 for the study, and could only begin if they indicated they had heard of Uber and correctly answered a reading comprehension test. Of the 306 people who began the study, four were excluded for submitted data from a duplicate IP address, and 18 were dropped for failing an attention check (described below), leaving 284 for analysis (142 in each condition; 55% female; 72% employed, 9% homemakers, 6% retired, 13% unemployed; *M* age = 37.55 years, *SD* = 12.81). The direction and significance of the results were identical without excluding these participants. We also screened for duplicate participant IDs but found none.

Entitativity manipulation. After reading a brief description of Uber and indicating their familiarity with it, participants were randomly assigned to read one of two newspaper articles similar to the ones used in Studies 1, S1, and S2 (see Verbatim Materials at https://tinyurl.com/yatg2p32). To heighten external validity, we based the articles on real reports, included only factual information, and formatted them in a realistic manner. In the high-entitativity condition, the article attributed Uber's success to technology that coordinates drivers' behavior, enabling them to work together towards their common goal of efficiently providing rides. The article also likened Uber drivers to a single species of fish swimming together in a school and included a photograph of a school of fish. In the low-entitativity condition, the article instead attributed Uber's success to drivers who make their own decisions about when and how to work, and independently seek to provide efficient rides. The article also likened Uber drivers to members of many different species of fish, each choosing its own path to swim, and included a photograph of diverse fish.

Attention and manipulation checks. Participants completed Study 1's attention check. To encourage participants to think about the manipulation, which as noted had drawn a comparison between Uber drivers and fish, we also asked them to describe how the members were like fish (free-response). Next, participants completed the entitativity scale used in Study 1 (α = .90).

Blame, commission, and omission. Participants next read about five misdeeds an Uber driver could commit. To enhance external validity, we selected misdeeds for which Uber has received media attention: booking and cancelling fake rides with drivers at competing organizations, exceeding the speed limit by 30 MPH, picking up passengers in a city that bans Uber from operating, overcharging passengers by taking a longer route, and picking up more

passengers than there are seat belts in the car. The order of the misdeeds was randomized across participants.

For each misdeed, participants first completed several filler items asking about their judgments of each misdeeds' severity and how much it should be punished. Then, using the scales from Study 2, participants indicated their judgments of blame, commission, and omission for each of the five misdeeds (1 = *Not at all*; 5 = *Extremely*). The target of these judgments was Uber's management. We averaged across the five misdeeds (for blame, commission, and omission, αs = .87, .88, and .90, respectively).

Harm. After rating all the misdeeds, participants rated how harmful they found each of the five misdeeds on five-point scales (α = .70). The purpose of this measure was to explore whether our hypothesized results were robust when we controlled for perceptions of harm. Controlling for this measure did not change the direction or significance of the results, so we do not discuss it further.

Organizational attractiveness. At the end of the study, participants completed the same three-item attractiveness measure used in Study 1 (α = .90).

Results and Discussion

Table S7 reports descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations.

Manipulation check. Uber members appeared more entitative in the high-entitativity condition (M = 3.72, SD = .65) than in the low-entitativity condition (M = 2.06, SD = .53), $t(282) = 23.60$, $p < .0001$, $d = 2.81$.

Entitativity increased blame. Supporting H2, participants blamed Uber's management more for its members' transgressions in the high-entitativity condition (M = 3.27, SD = .97) than in the low-entitativity condition (M = 2.60, SD = .97), $t(282) = 5.75$, $p < .0001$, $d = .69$. This

finding – which also emerged independently for each of the five misdeeds in the study, *p*s < .005 – conceptually replicates Study 2's results with a different organization.

Omission, and not commission, mediated the effect of entitativity on blame. We next estimated a structural equation model (SEM) with paths from entitativity (0 = low, 1 = high), to perceptions of omission and commission, to organizational blame, (see Figure S4), and we computed bias-corrected indirect effects with 5,000 bootstrap samples. Consistent with Study 2's results, entitativity's effect on organizational blame was driven by perceptions that Uber had failed to prevent the drivers' wrongdoing (omission) more than perceptions that it had encouraged the wrongdoing (commission). Specifically, the indirect effect from the entitativity manipulation to blame via omission was significant, b = .58 [.39, .77], but the indirect effect via commission was not, b = .02 [-.001, .05]. This finding partially supports H4. The difference between these two indirect effects was significant, b = .57 [.39, .75].

Organizational attractiveness. The results replicated Study 2's finding that, after participants have reflected on a series of transgressions by an organization's members, entitativity does not improve the organization's attractiveness. That is, participants were not significantly more attracted to the organization in the high-entitativity condition (M = 1.38, SD = 1.12) than in the low-entitativity condition (M = 1.39, SD = 1.06), $t(282) = .11$, $p = .91$, $d = .01$. As in Study 2, we found support for a possible explanation: that entitativity increased blame to senior management, which made the organization seem less attractive. That is, the results showed a significant indirect effect from the entitativity manipulation to blame to attractiveness, as in Study 2, b = –.19, bias-corrected 95% CI = [–.33, –.09], computed 5,000 bootstrap samples. Thus, although entitativity may increase an organization's attractiveness in general (Studies 1 and S1), entitativity appears *not* to increase attractiveness when member transgressions are salient (Studies 2 and S2).

Study S3

Study S3 was a pilot study run before Study 3. It follows a similar paradigm and produced similar results. The key measures used in this study are reported in Appendix 5 in the manuscript; complete materials are posted at https://tinyurl.com/yatg2p32

Method

Participants. We recruited participants who had heard of Uber and lived in three major cities where Uber operates: New York, Chicago, and San Francisco. We targeted this population because, as potential Uber customers in major markets, their judgments are particularly consequential for Uber. This population is thus highly relevant to our research focus. A survey company (ClearVoice) sought 300 complete responses (100 in each city) on our behalf. This sample size provides 80% power to detect a small correlation, $r = .16$. Participants were screened out before beginning if they said they had not heard of Uber, if they failed a reading comprehension question, or if they said they did not live in one the three targeted cities. Of the 305 people who passed the initial screening, 299 provided responses to the dependent measures (61% female; 67% employed, 14% retired, 11% unemployed, 8% homemakers; *M* age = 47.82, *SD* = 14.96). We checked for duplicate IP addresses or participant IDs (a sign of multiple responding) but found none.

Entitativity. First, participants rated Uber using the same established six-item measure of entitativity (Denson et al., 2006) that we used in Studies 1 and 2 ($\alpha = .90$).

Competence, warmth, and morality. We next administered the 11-item measure described in Studies 1 and S1 to assess perceptions of Uber's competence ($\alpha = .95$), warmth ($\alpha = .94$), and morality ($\alpha = .95$). As in our prior studies, competence was the hypothesized mediator.

Organizational attractiveness. Next, participants rated their attraction to Uber using the

three-item measure described in Study 1 (α = .93).

Exploratory measures. Then participants answered several other questions about their beliefs and attitudes towards Uber (e.g., how unsafe they think it is to use). These items were exploratory and not discussed further (see Verbatim Materials at https://tinyurl.com/yatg2p32).

Predicted goal achievement. Given that entitativity makes organizations seem more competent (see Studies 1 and S1), it stands to reason that entitativity should be associated with beliefs that an organization will be able to achieve a variety of goals. A supplementary measure examined this prediction: Participants rated on 5-point scales the likelihood that Uber would achieve each of six organizational goals (e.g., increase profits for the next 5 years; see materials on the OSF for a complete list; 1 = *Not at all likely*; 5 = *Extremely likely*). We averaged their responses (α = .89).

Blame. Our previous studies examined how people assign blame for a single organization member's wrongdoing. In the real world, however, multiple people in an organization sometimes commit the same wrongdoing. To assess our findings' generalizability to such situations, we described to participants a misdeed that multiple Uber employees allegedly committed, taken from real media accounts (Fink, 2014):

> One of Uber's competitors is a company called Lyft. Like Uber, Lyft allows people to hail cars from their smart phones. According to a news source, "ridesharing service Lyft claims that 177 Uber employees have ordered and cancelled about 5,560 rides since October last year, thereafter cutting into profits and driver availability."

As in Study 3, we measured how much blame participants assigned to senior leadership (this time, we asked specifically about Uber's CEO) and to Uber as an organization. Additionally, following prior work on entitativity, we examined how much participants blamed the transgressors' peers (Lickel et al., 2003) – specifically, Uber members other than the 177 who committed the wrongdoing. To explore whether entitativity would affect how much people

blamed the members who actually committed the wrongdoing, Study S3 also measured how much people blamed the 177 employees. For each party rated, we administered and averaged the two blame items from Study 1 (αs > .83).

Behavioral intentions. To examine whether entitativity could predict behavioral intentions towards an organization, we included two measures. First participants read, "Uber has received some bad publicity due to its corporate practices, and some high-profile cases of sexual assault by its drivers. Would you like to learn more about what you can do to protest against Uber?" Participants were informed that if they clicked "yes," they would be directed to information about how they can use social media to protest. We predicted that people who perceived Uber as more entitative would hold it more responsible for employee wrongdoing (booking fake rides), which would lead them to protest Uber for unrelated wrongdoing (questionable corporate practices and driver sexual assault).

The second behavioral-intention measure gave participants an opportunity to request information about how they could support Uber. It stated, "Many people really like Uber's services and want to spread the word among their friends. Would you like to learn more about what you can do promote Uber's brand?" Clicking "yes" would ostensibly direct them to information about using social media to help Uber.

Control variables. We included several control variables to assess robustness. At the beginning of the study, participants indicated their familiarity with Uber (5-point scale), whether they had ever used it, and (if they had) how many times they book Uber in a typical month (1-3, 4-8, 9-15, > 15, recoded as 0-4 for analysis, with 0 indicating they had never used Uber). At the end of the study, participants provided their age and gender. We first analyzed our data without controls; adding them did not change the significance level of any results, except where indicated

below. Our measures were embedded in a longer survey about Uber.

Measurement model. We performed a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to ensure our measures loaded onto the expected factors. A six-factor model including all of our constructs (entitativity, warmth, competence, morality, responsibility, and attitudes) fit the data well, χ^2 (284) = 917.10; χ^2/df = 3.23; CFI = .92; TLI = .91; RMSEA = .086 (see Table S8 for CFA results, and Table S9 for descriptive statistics and correlations).

Results and Discussion

Analytic approach. First, we tested the overall relationship between entitativity and our key outcomes – attraction (H1) and blame (H3) – using OLS regression. Then we tested the model shown in Figure S5 using Stata's *gsem* command (StataCorp, 2019), specifying logistic regression for the paths to the two binary outcomes (promotion and protest intentions). To compute indirect effects, we multiplied the relevant paths together, using 5,000 bootstrap resamples to compute bias-corrected 95% CIs (Rijnhart et al., 2019).

Entitativity predicts greater organizational attractiveness. Supporting H1, participants who perceived Uber members as more entitative were more attracted to Uber, b = .93, $t(297) = 11.19$, $p < .001$.

Supporting H2, perceptions of organizational competence mediated this link between entitativity and attractiveness. That is, the more of entitative people thought Uber members were, the more they viewed Uber as competent – and the more competent they found Uber, the more attracted they were to it, b = .61, 95% *CI* = [.49, .75].

Finally, consistent with the possibility that entitativity perceptions are associated with meaningful behavior, the results showed that people who perceived Uber as more entitative were more likely to request information about how to promote Uber on social media, b = 1.18, z = 5.58, $p < .001$. Moreover, the data were consistent with our hypothesized process. Specifically,

we observed a significant, positive indirect effect from perceptions of entitativity, to perceptions of competence, to attractiveness, to promoting Uber, b = .40, 95% *CI* = [.14, .66] (see Figure S5, top half). This effect was robust when we added warmth and morality as parallel mediators to competence.

Entitativity predicts greater organizational blame. Supporting H3, people who perceived Uber members as more entitative blamed Uber's CEO more for individual members' wrongdoing, b = 3.94, $t(297) = 1.99$, p = .047. Blame to Uber as an organization was also positively associated with entitativity, but not significantly so, b = 3.17, $t(297) = 1.65$, p = .100. (Note that this effect was significant in Study 3 with a larger sample size). Exploratory analyses found that entitativity also positively predicted blaming Uber members other than the 177 transgressors who had booked the fake rides, β = .21, b = 7.56, $t(297) = 3.68$, $p < .001$. The same results emerged when we controlled for the covariates, except the effect on judgments of the CEO was only marginally significant, β = .12, b = 4.13, $t(292) = 1.89$, p = .060.

Finally, entitativity perceptions were associated with behavioral intentions: The more entitative people thought Uber was, the more likely they were to try to protest Uber on social media for its members' wrongdoing, b = .64, $z = 2.79$, p = .005. This effect was significantly mediated by blame perceptions, b = .15, 95% CI = [.04, .31], (see Figure S5, bottom half), in an analysis that averaged the three blame measures into a composite measure (α = .83). The total effect of entitativity on protest intentions was not robust to our control variables, b = .26, z = .95, p = .341, but the mediation effect was robust.

Goal achievement. A supplementary analysis showed that the more entitative participants thought Uber was, the more likely they thought it would be to achieve a variety of goals, b = .56, $t(297) = 10.79$, $p < .001$. This result is consistent with our finding that people

associate organizational entitativity with competence.

Discussion

Study S3 largely replicates Study 3's results. Using natural variance in entitativity, we found evidence for the theorized path from entitativity to competence to organizational attraction to brand promotion. Unlike Study 3, Study S3 did not measure perceptions of commission and omission, but we did find evidence for the theorized path from entitativity to blame to protest.

References

Denson, T. F., Lickel, B., Curtis, M., Stenstrom, D. M., & Ames, D. R. (2006). The roles of entitativity and essentiality in judgments of collective responsibility. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, *9*(1), 43-61.

Fink, E. (2014, November 19, 2015). Uber's dirty tricks quantified: Rival counts 5,560 canceled rides. *CNN Money*. http://money.cnn.com/2014/08/11/technology/uber-fake-ride-requests-lyft/

Highhouse, S., Lievens, F., & Sinar, E. F. (2003). Measuring attraction to organizations. *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, *63*(6), 986-1001. https://doi.org/10.1177/0013164403258403

Lickel, B., Schmader, T., & Hamilton, D. L. (2003). A case of collective responsibility: Who else was to blame for the Columbine High School shootings? *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *29*(2), 194-204. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167202239045

Rijnhart, J. J. M., Twisk, J. W. R., Eekhout, I., & Heymans, M. W. (2019). Comparison of logistic-regression based methods for simple mediation analysis with a dichotomous outcome variable. *BMC Medical Research Methodology*, *19*(1), 19. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12874-018-0654-z

StataCorp. (2019). *Stata 16 Base Reference Manual*. StataCorp LLC.

Tables

Table S1

Descriptive Statistics and Pairwise correlations in Study 1

Variables	Mean	Std. Dev.	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
(1) Age	39.36	12.71	1.00						
(2) Gender[a]	0.62	0.49	0.15*	1.00					
(3) Entitativity[b]	0.49	0.50	0.05	-0.03	1.00				
(4) Warm	3.85	0.76	0.02	0.11	0.28*	1.00			
(5) Moral	3.80	0.76	0.05	0.14	0.24*	0.83*	1.00		
(6) Competent	4.18	0.67	0.03	0.08	0.24*	0.71*	0.74*	1.00	
(7) Attraction	1.97	0.81	0.06	0.15*	0.17*	0.66*	0.74*	0.70*	1.00

Notes. N = 196; [a] 0 = Male; 1 = Female; [b] 0 = No Entitativity Condition; 1 = Entitativity Condition; * $p < .05$

Table S2:

Descriptive Statistics and Pairwise correlations for Study 2

Variables	Mean	Std.Dev.	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
(1) Age	36.25	11.85	1.00						
(2) Gender[a]	0.57	0.49	0.13*	1.00					
(3) Entitativity[b]	0.43	0.50	-0.03	0.02	1.00				
(4) Org Type[c]	0.45	0.50	0.03	-0.03	-0.02	1.00			
(5) Commission	2.04	0.91	-0.21*	-0.09*	0.12*	-0.18*	1.00		
(6) Omission	3.11	1.02	-0.11*	0.06	0.21*	-0.30*	0.56*	1.00	
(7) Blame	3.06	1.12	-0.08	0.07	0.19*	-0.34*	0.59*	0.91*	1.00

Notes. N = 634; [a] 0 = Male; 1 = Female; [b] 0 = No Entitativity Condition; 1 = Entitativity Condition; [c] 1 = Holiday Inn; 2 = Airbnb; * $p < .05$

Table S3

Study 3 Analysis with the Blanchard et al. (2020) Measure of Entitativity, *Including* Control Variables, for Each Measure of Blame and Attraction

Prediction	Observed Statistics	Prediction supported?
Entitativity → Attraction[a] (H1)	b = .35, p < .001	Yes
Entitativity → Attraction[b] (H1)	b = .32, p < .001	Yes
Entitativity → Competence → Attraction[a] (H2)	b = .21, p < .001, 95% CI [.15, .28]	Yes
Entitativity → Competence → Attraction[b] (H2)	b = .20, p < .001, 95% CI [.16, .25]	Yes
Entitativity → Competence → Attraction[a] → Support	b = .13, p = .001, 95% CI [.07, .22]	Yes
Entitativity → Competence → Attraction[b] → Support	b = .09, p = .001, 95% CI [.04, .15]	Yes
Entitativity → Blame[c] (H3)	b = .11, p < .001	Yes
Entitativity → Blame[d] (H3)	b = .10, p < .001	Yes
Entitativity → Commission → Blame[c] (H4a)	b = .01, p = .004, 95% CI [.004, .025]	Yes
Entitativity → Commission → Blame[d] (H4a)	b = .01, p = .012, 95% CI [.002, .02]	Yes
Entitativity → Omission → Blame[c] (H4b)	b = .08, p < .001, 95% CI [.05, .11]	Yes
Entitativity → Omission → Blame[d] (H4b)	b = .07, p = .001, 95% CI [.03, .11]	Yes
Entitativity → Commission → Blame[c] → Opposition	b = .00, p = .97, 95% CI [-.01, .01]	No
Entitativity → Commission → Blame[d] → Opposition	b = .001, p = .59, 95% CI [-.002, .008]	No
Entitativity → Omission → Blame[c] → Opposition	b = .00, p = .97, 95% CI [-.04, .04]	No
Entitativity → Omission → Blame[d] → Opposition	b = .01, p = .48, 95% CI [-.02, .03]	No

Notes. [a] Attitudes as the measure of attraction; [b] Highhouse measure of attraction ; [c] Ascriptions of commission, omission and blame directed at Uber Management; [d] Ascriptions of commission, omission and blame directed at Uber as an Organization

Table S4

Study 3 Analysis with the Blanchard et al. (2020) Measure of Entitativity, *Without* Control Variables, for Each Measure of Blame and Attraction

Prediction	Observed Statistics	Prediction supported?
Entitativity → Attraction[a] (H1)	b = .43, p < .001	Yes
Entitativity → Attraction[b] (H1)	b = .42, p < .001	Yes
Entitativity → Competence → Attraction[a] (H2)	b = .27, p < .001, 95% CI [.23, .32]	Yes
Entitativity → Competence → Attraction[b] (H2)	b = .28, p < .001, 95% CI [.23, .32]	Yes
Entitativity → Competence → Attraction[a] → Support	b = .18, p < .001, 95% CI [.10, .26]	Yes
Entitativity → Competence → Attraction[b] → Support	b = .13, p < .001, 95% CI [.07, .19]	Yes
Entitativity → Blame[c] (H3)	b = .14, p < .001	Yes
Entitativity → Blame[d] (H3)	b = .13, p < .001	Yes
Entitativity → Commission → Blame[c] (H4a)	b = .02, p = .001, 95% CI [.007, .03]	Yes
Entitativity → Commission → Blame[d] (H4a)	b = .01, p = .028, 95% CI [.003, .02]	Yes
Entitativity → Omission → Blame[c] (H4b)	b = .10, p < .001, 95% CI [.07, .13]	Yes
Entitativity → Omission → Blame[d] (H4b)	b = .07, p = .001, 95% CI [.03, .11]	Yes
Entitativity → Commission → Blame[c] → Opposition	b = .001, p = .84, 95% CI [-.006, .007]	No
Entitativity → Commission → Blame[d] → Opposition	b = .001, p = .59, 95% CI [-.002, .008]	No
Entitativity → Omission → Blame[c] → Opposition	b = .004, p = .84, 95% CI [-.03, .04]	No
Entitativity → Omission → Blame[d] → Opposition	b = .01, p = .56, 95% CI [-.02, .05]	No

Notes. [a] Attitudes as the measure of attraction; [b] Highhouse measure of attraction ; [c] Ascriptions of commission, omission and blame directed at Uber Management; [d] Ascriptions of commission, omission and blame directed at Uber as an Organization

Table S5

Study 3 Analysis with the Denson et al. (2006) Measure of Entitativity, *Without* Control Variables, for Each Measure of Blame and Attraction

Prediction	Observed Statistics	Prediction supported?
Entitativity → Attraction[a] (H1)	*b* = .80, *p* < .001	Yes
Entitativity → Attraction[b] (H1)	*b* = .81, *p* < .001	Yes
Entitativity → Competence → Attraction[a] (H2)	*b* = .58, *p* < .001, 95% CI [.48, .70]	Yes
Entitativity → Competence → Attraction[b] (H2)	*b* = .57, *p* < .001, 95% CI [.46, .68]	Yes
Entitativity → Competence → Attraction[a] → Support	*b* = .43, *p* < .001, 95% CI [.26, .63]	Yes
Entitativity → Competence → Attraction[b] → Support	*b* = .28, *p* < .001, 95% CI [.16, .43]	Yes
Entitativity → Blame[c] (H3)	*b* = .32, *p* < .001	Yes
Entitativity → Blame[d] (H3)	*b* = .32, *p* < .001	Yes
Entitativity → Commission → Blame[c] (H4a)	*b* = .05, *p* < .001, 95% CI [.03, .08]	Yes
Entitativity → Commission → Blame[d] (H4a)	*b* = .04, *p* = .001, 95% CI [.02, .06]	Yes
Entitativity → Omission → Blame[c] (H4b)	*b* = .25, *p* < .001, 95% CI [.18, .32]	Yes
Entitativity → Omission → Blame[d] (H4b)	*b* = .27, *p* < .001, 95% CI [.21, .33]	Yes
Entitativity → Commission → Blame[c] → Opposition	*b* = -.01, *p* = .79, 95% CI [-.11, .08]	No
Entitativity → Commission → Blamed → Opposition	*b* = .001, *p* = .86, 95% CI [-.01, .02]	No
Entitativity → Omission → Blame[c] → Opposition	*b* = -.003, *p* = .8, 95% CI [-.03, .02]	No
Entitativity → Omission → Blame[d] → Opposition	*b* = .01, *p* = .86, 95% CI [-.09, .11]	No

Notes. [a] Attitudes as the measure of attraction; [b] Highhouse measure of attraction ; [c] Ascriptions of commission, omission and blame directed at Uber Management; [d] Ascriptions of commission, omission and blame directed at Uber as an Organization

Table S6

Descriptive Statistics and Pairwise correlations in Study S1

Variables	Mean	Std.Dev.	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
(1) Age	38.46	12.01	1.00							
(2) Gender[a]	0.47	0.50	0.13*	1.00						
(3) Entitativity[b]	0.50	0.50	-0.00	-0.03	1.00					
(4) Org Type[c]	0.50	0.50	-0.04	0.03	0.01	1.00				
(5) Warm	3.67	0.79	-0.00	0.06	0.04	-0.01	1.00			
(6) Moral	3.60	0.82	0.00	0.03	-0.00	-0.01	0.82*	1.00		
(7) Competent	4.07	0.70	0.06	0.03	0.14*	-0.05	0.67*	0.63*	1.00	
(8) Attraction	1.48	1.00	0.04	0.09*	0.07	-0.06	0.59*	0.54*	0.61*	1.00

Notes. N = 552; [a] 0 = Male; 1 = Female; [b] 0 = No Entitativity Condition; 1 = Entitativity Condition; [c] 0 = Holiday Inn; 1 = Airbnb; * $p < .05$

Table S7

Descriptive Statistics and Pairwise correlations in Study S2

Variables	Mean	Std.Dev.	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
(1) Age	37.55	12.81	1.00						
(2) Gender[a]	0.55	0.50	-0.05	1.00					
(3) Entitativity[b]	0.50	0.50	0.10	-0.03	1.00				
(4) Commission	1.83	0.75	-0.02	-0.06	0.10	1.00			
(5) Omission	2.97	0.96	0.04	0.05	0.35*	0.32*	1.00		
(6) Blame	2.93	1.03	0.09	0.05	0.32*	0.34*	0.85*	1.00	
(7) Attraction	1.39	1.09	-0.13*	-0.04	-0.01	-0.27*	-0.15*	-0.20*	1.00

Notes. N = 284; [a] 0 = Male; 1 = Female; [b] 0 = No Entitativity Condition; 1 = Entitativity Condition; * $p < .05$

Table S8

Confirmatory Factor Analyses Results for Study S3

Model	*Description*	χ^2	*df*	*CFI*	*TLI*	*RMSEA*	*Comparison with Model 1* $\Delta\chi^2$	*Δdf*
Model 1[a]	Five-Factor Model	172.60	80	.97	.97	.06		
Model 2[b]	Four-Factor Model	399.03	84	.91	.89	.12	226.43*	4
Model 3[l]	Three-Factor Model	489.64	87	.89	.87	.13	317.04*	7
Model 4[m]	Two-Factor Model	1014.32	89	.75	.70	.19	841.72*	9
Model 5[d]	One-Factor Model	2468.04	90	.35	.24	.31	2295.44*	10

Notes. N = 284; CFI = comparative fit index; TLI = Tucker–Lewis index; RMSEA = root-mean-square error of approximation. [a] Five Factor Model – Entitativity, Commission, Omission, Collective Responsibility and Attitudes; [b] Four Factor Model –Commission and Omission combined into a single factor with Entitativity, Attitudes and Collective Responsibility as other three factors; [c] Three Factor Model – Commission, Omission and Collective Responsibility measures combined into a single factor with Entitativity and Attitudes as other two factors; [d] Commission, Omission, Collective Responsibility and Attitudes combined into a single factor with Entitativity as the other factor; [e] All measures combined into one factor; * $p < .05$

Table S9

Means, SD and inter-item correlations for Study S3

		M	*SD*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	Age (Years)	47.82	14.96	-									
2	Gender [a]	0.61	0.49	0.02	-								
3	Familiarity with Uber	2.93	1.07	-0.46*	-0.12*	-							
4	Booking frequency	0.36	0.73	-0.41*	-0.09	0.62*	-						
5	Entitativity	2.97	0.84	-0.25*	-0.14*	0.37*	0.35*	*(.90)*					
6	Organizational Attractiveness	3.12	0.93	-0.26*	-0.04	0.41*	0.44*	0.68*	*(.97)*				
7	Attitudes	0.97	1.42	-0.25*	-0.01	0.29*	0.35*	0.55*	0.78*	*(.93)*			
8	Blame	57.48	25.04	0.02	0.00	0.1	0.08	0.16*	0.00	-0.1	*(.89)*		
9	Promotion intentions [b]	0.21	0.41	-0.37*	-0.07	0.36*	0.48*	0.35*	0.42*	0.37*	-0.02	-	
10	Protest intentions [b]	0.11	0.32	-0.16*	-0.08	0.17*	0.31**	0.16**	0.1	-0.03	0.22*	0.38*	-

Note: $N = 299$; * $p < .05$; Internal consistency reliabilities appear in parentheses along the diagonal; [a] Categorical variable: 0 = Male, 1 = Female [b] Categorical variable: 1 = Yes, 0 = No.

Figures

Figure S1

Entitativity Manipulation Check in Study 2 (*M* ± *SE*)



Note. *y*-axis shows full range of response options.

Figure S2

Blame Measure in Study 2 (*M* ± *SE*)



Note. *y*-axis shows full range of response options.

Figure S3

Path Diagram in Study S1



Notes: Unstandardized regression coefficients; [a] *Direct effect of IV on DV after accounting for the three indirect effects;* * $p < .05$

Figure S4

Path Diagrams in Study 2. Indirect effect of entitativity manipulation on blame via commission and omission



Note. Values are unstandardized coefficients. We tested fully saturated models, but the bottom panel omits some direct effects between nonadjacent variables for clarity * $p < .05$.

Figure S5: Path Analysis in Study S3



Note. Values are unstandardized coefficients. * $p < .05$

Appendix S1:

Measures in Study S1

Please see https://tinyurl.com/yatg2p32 for complete verbatim materials.

Manipulation Check: Entitativity (Denson et al., 2006)

1. To what extent do members of this organization interact with each other?
2. To what extent can the behavior of members of this organization be controlled or influenced by other members of this organization?
3. To what extent do members of this organization have formal or informal rules?
4. To what extent are there strong interpersonal bonds among members this organization associated with Uber?
5. To what extent do members of this organization share knowledge and information with each other?
6. To what extent do members of this organization have common goals?

Organizational Attractiveness (Highhouse et al., 2003)

On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree, please answer the following. Suppose you want to hail a ride. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements:

1. This company would provide a good place to say
2. I would not be interested in booking a place to stay with this company except as a last resort (*reversed*)
3. This company is attractive to me for booking a place to stay
4. I would be interested in learning more about what this company can offer in terms of places to stay
5. Booking a place to stay with this company is very appealing to me

Competence, Warmth, and Morality

To what extent do each of the following words describe [Airbnb/Holiday Inn] in your opinion?

[*C = competence, W = warm, M = moral*]

1. Honest (M)
2. Trustworthy (M)
3. Warm (W)
4. Effective (C)
5. Friendly (W)
6. Likeable (W)
7. Sincere (M)
8. Capable (C)
9. Efficient (C)
10. Ethical (M)
11. Competent (C)

Appendix S2:

Measures in Study S2

Please see https://tinyurl.com/yatg2p32 for complete verbatim materials.

Manipulation Check: Entitativity (Denson et al., 2006)

[*We used the items listed in Appendix S1, replacing "this company" with "Uber."*]

The Driver's Wrongdoing

[*Participants completed the measures of blame, commission, omission, and harm for each of the following wrongdoings a driver could commit]*

1. Picking up more passengers than there are seat belts for
2. Overcharging a passenger by taking a longer route
3. Booking a fake ride with a competing ride sharing company
4. Picking up passengers in a city where Uber is banned
5. Exceeding the speed limit by 30 MPH

Blame (B), Commission (C), and Omission (O)

[*The text in brackets varied to specify each of the wrongdoings participants rated, e.g., "picking up passengers in a city where Uber was banned"]*

If an Uber driver [committed this wrongdoing] …

1. To what extent would Uber's management be privately glad? (C)
2. To what extend would Uber's management have directly or indirectly encouraged this driver to [commit the wrongdoing]? (C)
3. To what extent should Uber's management have prevented this driver from [committing the wrongdoing]? (O)
4. To what extent should Uber's management have known that this driver was [committing the wrongdoing]? (O)
5. How responsible should Uber's management be held? (B)
6. How much should Uber's management be held accountable? (B)

Harm

How harmful do you think it is for an Uber driver to … [commit this wrongdoing]?

Organizational Attractiveness

1. How positive or negative is your overall impression of Uber?
2. Overall, how good or bad for consumers do you think Uber is?
3. Overall, how good or bad do you think it would be if Uber's business expanded to new cities?